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Abstract
Introduction Various experimental manipulations, usually
involving drug administration, have been used to produce
symptoms of psychosis in healthy volunteers. Different
drugs produce both common and distinct symptoms. A
challenge is to understand how apparently different manip-
ulations can produce overlapping symptoms. We suggest
that current Bayesian formulations of information process-
ing in the brain provide a framework that maps onto neural
circuitry and gives us a context within which we can relate
the symptoms of psychosis to their underlying causes. This
helps us to understand the similarities and differences
across the common models of psychosis.
Materials and methods The Bayesian approach emphasises
processing of information in terms of both prior expectan-
cies and current inputs. A mismatch between these leads us
to update inferences about the world and to generate new
predictions for the future. According to this model, what we
experience shapes what we learn, and what we learn
modifies how we experience things.
Discussion This simple idea gives us a powerful and
flexible way of understanding the symptoms of psychosis
where perception, learning and inference are deranged. We
examine the predictions of the cognitive model in light of
what we understand about the neuropharmacology of
psychotomimetic drugs and thereby attempt to account for
the common and the distinctive effects of NMDA receptor
antagonists, serotonergic hallucinogens, cannabinoids and
dopamine agonists.
Conclusion By acknowledging the importance of percep-
tion and perceptual aberration in mediating the positive
symptoms of psychosis, the model also provides a useful
setting in which to consider an under-researched model of
psychosis—sensory deprivation.
Keywords Bayesianlearning.Predictionerror.Perception.
Belief.Psychotomimeticdrugs
Introduction
[The] world is …what we make of it. Once our mould
for world making is formed it most strongly resists
change. The psychodelics (sic) allow us, for a little
while, to divest ourselves of these acquired assump-
tions and to see the universe again with an innocent
eye (Osmond 1957).
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clinical implications, Humphrey Osmond outlined what he
felt were the future directions for the field of model
psychoses. He emphasised a number of themes, including
the importance of drug-induced alterations in perceptions
and expectations. This is an interesting starting point for
our paper because, as has often been noted (Corlett et al.
2007; Freedman 1974; Maher 1974; McGhie and Chapman
1961), such alterations may be an important component of
the state of emerging psychosis (see Corlett et al. 2007 for
discussion).
Drug models of psychosis need a cognitive neuroscience
perspective. Without it, though the pharmacology of such
models may be understood with great subtlety and
sophistication, our understanding of how the pharmacology
links to the symptoms will remain incomplete (Kandel
1999; Kapur 2003). It may ultimately prove that this link
will be critical in understanding how it is that such apparently
different manipulations lead to common symptoms.
The cognitive framework that we apply derives from a
current theory of brain function (Friston 2005a)a n d
emphasises the hierarchical interactions between top-down
and bottom-up processes, which enable our perception and
prediction of the world (Friston 2005a; Mumford 1992).
Our suggestion is that all experimental interventions that
induce psychotic symptoms affect the interaction between
subjects' predictions about the world and the sensory inputs
that they encounter. Under normal circumstances, this
interaction shapes experience and learning and, when it is
disrupted, these will be correspondingly altered, engender-
ing the altered experiences that characterise the effects of
psychotomimetic drug administration (Freedman 1974)a s
well as the early stages of endogenous psychoses (Maher
1974; McGhie and Chapman 1961).
Having drawn attention to the key features of this model,
we will outline how the processes might be implemented in
the brain. We will go on to consider how each of the major
psychotomimetic drugs interacts with this model of brain
function and therefore how these apparently very different
neurochemical manipulations may produce common psy-
chological effects. There are, however, notable differences
between the psychotomimetic drugs, and we will attempt to
account for these within the scheme. Finally, we will test
the predictions of our model with reference to sensory
deprivation—a preparation that induces psychotic symptoms
non-pharmacologically(Bextonetal.1954; Scott et al. 2007).
Learning, expectation and mismatch: Bayesian ideas
of how we experience the world
Bayesian perspectives on cognitive processing are now
very widespread (Shanks 2006). They emphasise a central
theme that has long been present even in models that do not
explicitly mention Bayes: that of perception as ‘uncon-
scious inference’ (Barlow 1990; Helmholtz 1871/1971).
The key insight offered here is that our perception (our
experience of the world) is conditional upon what we
expect and in turn leads to inferences about the world,
which alter future expectations. There are numerous
illusions which reflect this simple truth, producing their
effects by appealing to prior beliefs such that incoming
sensory information is seemingly altered to fit with these.
This is the essence of Bayes' Theorem: Incoming informa-
tion is interpreted in light of our prior expectations.
Critical to understanding such models is the recognition
that mismatches between expected and actual inputs,
known as prediction errors (Rescorla and Wagner 1972;
Schultz and Dickinson 2000), are important in learning and
experience. Bayesian treatments of learning and perception
represent subjects' beliefs—their predictions about the
world—as a probability distribution (Kruschke 2008). A
key problem faced by the brain is to infer the causes of
sensory events in the environment (Friston 2005a) and to
use those causes in cognition and comportment (Mumford
1992). A measure of its success at any time is if the
environment is well-predicted, that is, if prediction error
(also referred to as ‘free energy’; Friston 2005a) engen-
dered by environmental events is minimised. To meet the
challenge of minimising error, new information must be
integrated with existing world models, where necessary
leading to updating of these models such that recurrence of
that particular information can be made predictable.
In terms of David Marr's levels of analysis (Marr 1982),
the model offers an explanation of what the brain must
achieve: First at the computational level, it predicts its
sensory inputs in order to respond adaptively to its
environment. Second, at the algorithmic level, it employs
a hierarchical Bayesian strategy to make and adapt this
prediction. Third, at the level of implementation, we
suggest that feedback (NMDA) and feed-forward (AMPA)
signalling in the hierarchy are responsible for the specifi-
cation of the priors (or predictions) and the prediction error
respectively and that, furthermore, the impact of a particular
prediction error is modulated by various slow, modulatory
neurotransmitters (dopamine and acetylcholine).
The same interactive framework has been applied to
single neurons, whose behaviour is driven by their inputs as
well as their expectancies based on prior experience
(Deneve 2008a, b; Fiorillo 2008). In one such model, the
inputs are specified by glutamatergic signals incumbent
upon the cell. In these finer-grained treatments, priors are
specified by the number and functional status of potassium
channels in the cell membrane, which modulate the cell's
responsivity to stimulation (Fiorillo 2008). We note with
interest that individuals with an autoimmune disorder,
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potassium channels, experience delusional beliefs (Hudson
et al. 2008; Parthasarathi et al. 2006). In our framework,
impairing potassium channel function would perturb the
specification of priors at the single cell level. Furthermore,
the slower, modulatory neurotransmitters like dopamine
and acetylcholine, which we argue are also involved in the
top-down specification of priors, interact with membrane
potassium channels and may modulate sensory expectan-
cies in this way (McCormick et al. 1993).
However, the model is hierarchical and, although this
may be an efficient approach to neural coding (Friston
2005a), it is vulnerable to disruption particularly through
the inconsistent specification of priors. Perhaps the distor-
tion of a sensory message through the system's hierarchy
might be analogous to something resembling the children's
game ‘Telephone’. In this game, children sit in a circle, and
one whispers a story in the ear of their neighbour, who
whispers it to their neighbour and so on, until the story passes
around the circle. The first and last stories never match, and
themorechildreninvolvedinpassingthe message,the greater
the distortion (Lyons and Kashima 2003). At each level, any
ambiguity (noise) in the message is resolved according to
priors superimposed at that level—what is known changes
the interpretation of the percept (Bartlett 1932; Lyons and
Kashima 2003)—the consequence being a marked and
increasing departure of the message from its original
meaning. Such a departure might explain the perceptions
and beliefs of the psychotic state (Fletcher and Frith 2008).
Some theoretical models of psychosis have drawn, both
implicitly and explicitly on this framework. Acknowledg-
ing the importance of interactions between prior (‘stored’)
beliefs and current sensory input, Gray and Hemsley (Gray
et al. 1991) speculated that psychosis arises when abnormal
matches and mismatches occur, making the world difficult
to prioritise, learn about and understand. Such a state is
characterised by perceptual changes wherein background
stimuli that would normally be considered irrelevant are
imbued with inappropriate significance, an experience
which demands explanation (Freedman 1974;K a p u r
2003; McGhie and Chapman 1961). Hemsley and Garety
discussed delusions in terms of deviation from optimal
Bayesian interpretation of the world (Hemsley and Garety
1986). More recently, models of psychosis drawing on
advances in cognitive neuroscience have taken these ideas
further (Kapur 2003) and have appealed directly to
hierarchical Bayesian models (Young 2008) in interpreting
delusions and hallucinations (Fletcher and Frith 2008;
Friston 2005a). Here, we attempt to extend these perspec-
tives by considering this model of processing in terms of
underlying neurochemistry.
The key cognitive model here, put simply, is that our
beliefs and percepts emerge from the interaction of bottom-
up and top-down processes. Strong top-down effects (akin
to prior beliefs) change sensory experience, leading perhaps
to sensory percept in the absence of a genuine stimulus (a
hallucination). Conversely, aberrant bottom-up signals
strongly indicate that the current priors are wrong and that
beliefs (priors) must be changed to explain the world. Such
aberrant changes in beliefs may provide the germ of a
delusion and will, moreover if they can account for the
aberrant sensory signals, be maintained (Fleminger 1992;
Fletcher and Frith 2009; Pally 2005, 2007). One key point
about this model is that the distinction between psychopa-
thology that is essentially ‘sensory’ in nature (hallucina-
tions) and that which is related to belief (delusions) is an
over-simplification. It would be simplistic to argue that
exclusively bottom-up (Maher 1974) or solely top-down
(Garety et al. 1994) explanations of psychopathology are
sufficient to explain symptoms. Indeed, there are situations
in which either direction of processing can be responsible
for the aberrations of experience that underlie the positive
symptoms of psychosis. We do suggest however that a
tendency towards excessive bottom-up signalling can
portend the construction of a delusional belief (especially
in the context of weakened top-down priors), while a
relative imbalance of processing in favour of top-down
signalling (often in the face of noisy or unpredictable
bottom-up inputs) can lead to hallucinations and the
maintenance of delusional beliefs.
Bayesian processing in the brain: possible underlying
neurocircuitry
Glutamate and GABA
To be successful, we must sustain a set of prior beliefs that
are sufficiently robust that we do not react reflexively and
chaotically to any incoming sensory stimulus. At the same
time, these beliefs (priors) must not be so immutable that
responses become fixed, stereotypical and unadaptive to
change. The Bayesian hierarchical organisation introduced
above may be important in striking this balance. Information
progresses from regions more proximal to sensory inputs
towards more distal, abstract representations in associational
cortices (Mesulam 1998). Within this hierarchy, feed-
forward connections transfer information from the bottom
upwards and feedback connections mediate the top-down
specification of predictions (Friston 2005a). These connec-
tions are reciprocal but they are functionally asymmetrical;
forward connections have sparse axonal bifurcations and are
topographically organised, whereas backward connections
are more divergent, having abundant axonal bifurcations
and a more diffuse topography (Angelucci et al. 2002a, b).
Forward connections are driving and always elicit a
response, whereas backward connections are modulatory
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siveness to other inputs (Sherman and Guillery 1998).
Critically, from the perspective of this paper, in which we
speculate on the consequence of neurochemical perturbation,
forward connections signal via fast post-synaptic AMPA and
GABAA receptors, while modulatory effects are mediated
via slower NMDA receptors, suggesting a more enduring
role than phasic sensory-evoked responses (Friston 2005a).
Thus, in terms of this model, the ‘bottom-up’ information
proceeds via forward AMPA signalling and the top-down
predictions (the priors which determine the impact of the
bottom-up signal) via NMDA receptors. If a small mismatch
between expectancy and experience occurs, the top-down
aspect of the system is able to cancel the prediction error;
however, if the prediction error is larger, then the top-down
priors (which represent the estimated world model) should
be altered such that the prediction is more appropriate next
time around. In this case, learning has occurred (Fig. 1).
While this hierarchical Bayesian arrangement fits well
with the neurobiology of the visual system (Friston 2005a;
Mumford 1992), many cortical systems adhere to similar
hierarchical principles (Hilgetag et al. 2000). Importantly,
the frontostriatal system that mediates reward learning
has been considered similarly hierarchical (Bar-Gad and
Bergman 2001; Bar-Gad et al. 2000, 2003). Indeed, the
functional anatomy of this learning system (Lorincz 1997)
and its behavioural output have been scrutinised within this
Bayesian framework (Courville et al. 2006; Kruschke et al.
2005). Frontostriatal prediction error signals are intimately
involved in causal learning and reasoning (Corlett et al.
2004; Fletcher et al. 2001; Turner et al. 2004). Recent
computational neuroscience models highlight the role of
prediction error in perceptual learning and decision making,
both in forging associations between sensory representation
and in tuning perceptual sensitivity in middle temporal
cortex (Law and Gold 2009). Moreover, den Ouden and
colleagues recently demonstrated powerful regulatory rela-
tionships between sensory cortex responses and frontos-
triatal prediction error signals when human subjects learned
the relationships between visual and auditory stimuli (den
Ouden et al. 2009).
ThelinkbetweentheproposedBayesianframeworkandthe
traditional reward-prediction error view also receives support
from neurochemical and electrophysiological analyses; the
prediction error coding midbrain dopamine neurons co-release
both dopamine and glutamate at their pre-frontal projections
sites (Lavin et al. 2005), and the impact of future prediction
error signals is under top-down regulation from pre-frontal
cortex through NMDA receptor-based mechanisms (Grace
1991). These relationships support the notion that prediction
error processing is a basic mode of brain function (Schultz
and Dickinson 2000) and that perception, learning and
prediction error are intimately linked (Barlow 1990).
The role of modulatory neurotransmitters
We have focussed on glutamatergic signalling in the visual
system and its role in prediction error. Within the
frontostriatal and sensory systems, other neuromodulators
like dopamine, acetylcholine and serotonin may provide
valuable additional information for the system. Friston
suggests that this is in the form of something akin to a
‘confidence estimate’ on the information being conveyed
between regions (Friston 2005a). Put simply, if the unit of
information carried between regions or levels of the
hierarchy is the prediction error (Fiorillo 2008), this will
have both magnitude and uncertainty. Optimal inference
requires consideration of both measures. If, as we have
suggested, fast glutamate signalling codes the presence and
magnitude of mismatch, slower, neuromodulators represent
the uncertainty in that inference (Friston 2005a). This
uncertainty signalling role has been ascribed to various
neuromodulators, including dopamine (Fiorillo et al. 2003)
and acetylcholine (Yu and Dayan 2002, 2005).
During reward learning, both dopaminergic and cholin-
ergic signals are involved in coding decision uncertainty. In
simple appetitive Pavlovian conditioning, during the period
between cue offset and reward delivery, Fiorillo and
colleagues recorded a gradually ramping dopamine signal,
of greatest magnitude when the forthcoming outcome was
most uncertain (i.e. when the cue that had just been
presented was equally predictive of reward or no reward).
Furthermore, corticopetal acetylcholine release occurs in
response to prediction errors and serves to sculpt the neural
representation of sensory cues associated with prediction
error responses (Bao et al. 2001). This modulation of
sensory processing by acetylcholine has recently been
confirmed in visual cortex by Herrero and colleagues who
argue that an interaction between acetylcholine and gluta-
matergic feedback mediates attentional processing in
sensory areas. Increased levels of acetylcholine alter the
strengths of the connections in primary visual cortex and
the biophysical state of sensory neurons, which may then
allow spatially specific glutamatergic feedback to enhance
the processing of specific incoming information (Herrero et
al. 2008), with a view to learning more about the previously
unpredictable stimulus (Pearce and Hall 1980).
We have depicted a model of processing involving
predictions and outcomes, with mismatches between the
two leading to learning and thereby to changes in subsequent
predictions. The model relates Bayesian ideas of inference,
experience, belief and learning and also highlights principles
of reciprocity, which are upheld in brain structure and
function. There is also evidence for aligning such a system
to particular neurochemical circuitry. It follows that deficits
in the system might predict disturbances in perception,
learning and inference. In the setting of this simple model,
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psychosis—glutamatergic, serotonergic, cannabinoid-based
and dopaminergic. We outline for each the psychotic
phenomena that they replicate and discuss how each model's
putative neurochemistry might relate to the Bayesian model
of psychopathology outlined above.
Ketamine and psychotic symptoms
Both ketamine and PCP block NMDA receptor transmis-
sion in mammalian neurons (Anis et al. 1983). This
observation, coupled with the psychopathology induced
by ketamine in healthy volunteers (Corlett et al. 2006;
Krystal et al. 1994; Oye et al. 1992) and patients with
schizophrenia (Malhotra et al. 1997), led to the develop-
ment of the NMDA hypofunction model of schizophrenia
(Javitt and Zukin 1991; Kornhuber 1990).
Single doses of ketamine induce a transient psychotic
state in healthy volunteers characterised by perceptual
aberrations, delusion-like ideas, thought disorder, blunted
affect and emotional withdrawal (Bowdle et al. 1998;
Corlett et al. 2006; Krystal et al. 1994; Malhotra et al.
1996; Newcomer et al. 1999; Oye et al. 1992; Vollenweider
et al. 1997a, b). Particularly relevant to the present model,
ketamine affects the intensity and integrity of the sensory
experience (Krystal et al. 1994). For both auditory and
visual perception, acuity is increased and background
stimuli become more salient (Krystal et al. 1994; Oye et
al. 1992; Vollenweider et al. 1997a, b).
In addition to impairing NMDA transmission, ketamine
binds to D2 dopamine receptors (Kapur and Seeman 2001)
and induces striatal dopamine release in healthy volunteers
(Smith et al. 1998). The magnitude of this release correlates
with the intensity of ketamine-induced psychosis (Breier et
al. 1998; Vollenweider et al. 2000). However, haloperidol,
an anti-psychotic which affords high D2 receptor blockade,
fails to reverse the psychotomimetic effects of ketamine
(Krystal et al. 1999). On the other hand, compounds which
reduce pre-synaptic glutamate release do attenuate the
psychotic symptoms (Anand et al. 2000) as does blockade
of AMPA receptor function in experimental animals
(Moghaddam et al. 1997).
Fig. 1 A schematic representation of the effects of a shift in balance
between bottom-up and top-down processing. Bottom-up signal is
represented by blue arrows and top-down signal (‘priors’)b yred
arrows. Discrepancies between these signals are presented by differ-
ences in the thickness of the arrows and by the cartoon scales. Under
normal circumstances (left panel), the match between bottom-up
signal and prior knowledge means that there is no requirement to
change prior beliefs and perception is normal. If, however, there is
persistent bottom-up firing (prediction error), prior beliefs will
continually fail to match the incoming signal and will need to be
changed in order to accommodate the signal and minimise the
persistent prediction error. This, we suggest, is a basis for changed
beliefs characteristic of delusions (middle panel). If, on the other hand
(right panel), strong priors exist in the absence of strong reliable
bottom-up signal, these priors may be sufficient to create a percept, a
basis, we suggest for hallucinations
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NMDA transmission, may actually potentiate post-synaptic
AMPA currents (Shi and Zhang 2003). MK801, a congener
of ketamine and PCP, decreases burst activity but increases
the number of randomly distributed single spikes in pre-
frontal neurons of awake rats (Jackson et al. 2004). Jackson
and colleagues postulate that the increased random spiking
is induced by AMPA receptor stimulation and that
decreased burst firing is induced by NMDA receptor
blockade (Jackson et al. 2004). The reduction in burst
firing may cause a reduction in signal transmission
efficiency of pre-frontal cortex neurons (Miller and Cohen
2001; O'Donnell and Grace 1995), impairing the cortical
mediation of normal behaviours. At the same time,
random spikes may increase cortical noise, thus impair-
ing the filtering of irrelevant information and promoting
the transmission of misinformation (Lisman and Grace
2005).
In the context of the current model, we relate the random
spiking mediated by AMPA receptor stimulation to inap-
propriate feed-forward information (i.e. prediction error),
while the decreased burst firing would represent the
impaired specification of prior expectancies. In short, we
suggest that AMPA upregulation leads to a disturbance
within the model that repeatedly engenders, through
aberrant, bottom-up, prediction error, a sense that incidental
stimuli or events are associated with a prediction error and
are therefore special or ‘salient’, requiring attention and
explanation (Fig. 2b). The world begins to feel different,
leading to erroneous explanations and even ideas of
reference (Pomarol-Clotet et al. 2006). In support of this,
our own data suggest that subjects who experience the most
profound perceptual changes experienced under ketamine
are more likely to develop transient delusion-like beliefs
(Corlett et al. 2006). Moreover, fMRI suggests that the drug
does indeed lead to disturbed prediction error firing (Corlett
et al. 2006). We contend that this disturbance is mediated
by a ketamine-induced augmentation of pre-synaptic
glutamate release and consequent post-synaptic AMPA
receptor stimulation. If either of these effects is blocked,
the psychotomimetic aspects of ketamine administration are
attenuated (Anand et al. 2000; Moghaddam and Adams
1998). That the perceptual aberrations and delusion-like
ideas are not directly linked to NMDA blockade but
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Fig. 2 A summary of the suggested effects of key manipulations used to induce psychosis on bottom-up/top-down balance
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by a recent SPECT study showing that NMDA blockade
correlates with the severity of negative rather than positive
symptoms (Stone et al. 2008).
To put things more simply in the context of the
hierarchical Bayesian model, we suggest that ketamine
and PCP disturb the feed-forward mechanism (prediction
error signal) through AMPA upregulation and the feedback
constraint (priors) through NMDA blockade. We believe
that the impairment of NMDA function would limit the
extent to which priors could exert their effect in explaining
the mismatch that is carried by the upregulated AMPA
signalling. This would lead to persistence of perceptual
aberrations due in part to persistent AMPA signalling and in
part to an attenuation of the constraining effect that priors
would normally afford on perception. That is, under
ketamine, the subject experiences perceptual aberrations
(due to AMPA upregulation) and a reduced capacity to
accommodate and ignore these aberrations (due to NMDA
blockade). We suggest that this combination leads to the
powerful changes in experience and inference that charac-
terise glutamatergic model psychoses. In the following
sections, we consider the ways that other drugs produce
differing types of imbalance in this feed-forward-feedback
system, perhaps accounting for differing effects.
Serotonergic drugs
LSD and other serotonergic hallucinogens induce profound
visual hallucinations, together with altered experiences of
time, space and the self (Geyer and Vollenweider 2008).
Acute LSD does not appear to induce delusions, at least
consistently across subjects (Young 1974), although some
subjects do experience a profound paranoia (Cohen 1966).
Serotonergic hallucinogens act at 5-HT receptors; how-
ever, they also impact upon glutamatergic transmission
(Aghajanian and Marek 2000), enhancing glutamatergic
responses to sensory stimuli in the locus coeruleus
(Rasmussen and Aghajanian 1986). Cortically, 5-HT
stimulation enhances excitatory glutamatergic post-
synaptic potentials, an effect most pronounced in frontal
cortex (Aghajanian and Marek 1997). The effect is blocked
by mglur 2/3 agonists (Marek et al. 2000), suggesting that
serotonergic hallucinogens induce an increase in pre-
synaptic glutamate release in frontal cortex.
Intriguingly, although LSD alters glutamatergic function,
it does not impair NMDA signalling (Aghajanian and
Marek 2000) and may actually enhance it (Lambe and
Aghajanian 2006). This observation points towards a
potential explanation of the different effects of LSD and
ketamine on perception. LSD induces visual and auditory
hallucinations, while ketamine tends to alter the salience
and/or vividness of real percepts rather than inducing
hallucinations per se (Corlett et al. 2006, although see
Stone and Pilowsky 2006). Within the framework that we
have outlined, excessive AMPA signalling in the absence of
NMDA impairment would lead to increased sensory noise
in the context of normal priors or expectancies. We
speculate that impaired bottom-up processing coupled with
preserved top-down processing is exactly the combination
of conditions in which one would expect hallucinations to
occur since a preserved top-down signal imposes structure
upon noisy inputs. Put more simply, the persistence and
strength of the sensory signal suggest that there is
something to be explained, and the preserved top-down
structure posits this explanation in terms of a stimulus that
gives rise to it: a stimulus that is not actually present. This,
in essence, is a hallucination—a percept without a stimulus.
How can we reconcile this account of serotonergic
hallucinogens (noisy, unpredictable bottom-up signalling
in the context of preserved and perhaps enhanced top-down
processing) with the observation that serotonergic halluci-
nogens do occasionally engender delusion-like ideas?
(Cohen 1966) It may be that the delusions engendered by
LSD arise from the autoscopic, out of body, experiences
that are commonly induced (Salama 1981). That is, under
LSD, the hallucination of a double of oneself may lead, for
example, to ideas of reference in contrast to ketamine where
such ideas emerge from aberrant experiences of external
objects events and people (Corlett et al. 2007; Oye et al.
1992). Cohen (1966) suggests this mechanism and there are
reported cases that seem to support this, for example, a subject
who, on using LSD, perceived himself on television acting as
one of the stars (Salama 1981). The experience of a double of
oneself also occurs with high frequency during social and
sensory deprivation (Mishara 2008) and, with relevance to our
model, has been ascribed to an excessively strong top-down
expectancy of the presence of others (Hoffman 2007). We
shall revisit this theme below when we consider sensory
deprivation but conclude this consideration of serotonergic
hallucinations and bodily delusions in the Bayesian frame-
work by attributing them to bottom-up noise in the face of
enhanced top-down expectancy (Blanke et al. 2004).
A relative excess of top-down influence has previously
been hypothesised to underlie hallucinatory behaviour.
Grossberg, for example, emphasises the role of dopamine-
driven motivational processes in the shift towards top-down
influences (Grossberg 2000), while Collerton and col-
leagues suggest that due to cholinergic and dopaminergic
dysfunctions, top-down inferences pre-dominate and induce
recurrent visual hallucinations (Collerton et al. 2005). Our
account encompasses both of these possibilities, but
emphasises the role of more fundamental ascending and
descending glutamatergic projections.
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There is not a single, elementary manifestation of
mental illness that cannot be found in the mental
changes induced by hashish. (Moreau 1845/1973)
In the 1980s, an endogenous cannabinoid system was
identifiedinthemammalianbrain(Devaneetal.1988, 1992).
Cannabinoid receptors (Matsuda et al. 1990), endogenous
ligands (Devane et al. 1992), second messenger systems
(Stella et al. 1997) and cannabinoid receptor antagonists
(Rinaldi-Carmona et al. 1994) were identified. Furthermore,
synthetic Δ-9-THC was shown to have psychotomimetic
effects in healthy volunteers (D'Souza et al. 2004). Like
ketamine, Δ-9-THC induces dopamine release in the healthy
human striatum; however, across subjects, the elevation in
dopamine release does not correlate with the subjective
effects of the drug (Bossong et al. 2008). Furthermore,
haloperidol does not reverse the psychotomimetic effects of
Δ-9-THC in healthy volunteers (D'Souza et al. 2008).
Within the current framework, a clue to the action of the
Δ-9-THC comes from its impact upon a visual illusion held
to depend on the interaction between top-down expectan-
cies and bottom-up experiences: the binocular depth
inversion illusion (BDII; Emrich 1989;K o e t h ee ta l .
2006). This is a visual illusion wherein an object that is
actually concave is seen as convex, e.g. a hollow, concave,
face mask will continue to be experienced as convex, an
experience which, although objectively wrong, is the
expected and more plausible percept. This illusion is
thought to occur through a top-down, internal mechanism,
which corrects implausible data so they conform to more
plausible hypotheses. In chronic cannabis users, individuals
with schizophreniform psychosis, those in a prodromal
psychotic state and healthy volunteers who administered Δ-
9-THC, the BDII is attenuated (Koethe et al. 2006; Semple
et al. 2003). This suggests an effect of active psychosis and
cannabinoid signalling on top-down correction of percep-
tion (Emrich et al. 1991; Schneider et al. 1996).
In contrast to THC, ketamine has no effect on the BDII,
despite inducing perceptual changes and psychotic symp-
toms (Passie et al. 2003). This raises the intriguing
possibility that the effects on perception of the two drugs
are dissociable: Ketamine has a pre-dominant impact on
bottom-up AMPA signalling in contrast to the pre-dominant
top-down effect THC suggested above. Δ9-THC increases
pre-frontal glutamate release (Pistis et al. 2002), like
ketamine. However, in the hippocampus, cannabinoids act
pre-synaptically to inhibit Ca
2+-induced release of gluta-
mate and acetylcholine (Fujiwara and Egashira 2004). We
have argued that these two neurotransmitters are intimately
involved in the specification of priors, and in the absence of
strong priors, one would predict a weaker BDII and a
weaker influence of top-down processes (Fig. 2f). As
mentioned above, this weakening of top-down influences
would suggest that hallucinations should not pre-dominate
under Δ9-THC administration, and this appears to be the
case, however, that delusion-like ideas would be predicted,
and this is borne out by studies exploring the impact of
THC on healthy volunteers (D'Souza et al. 2004).
Dopamine agonists
With some caveats, dopamine remains at the forefront of
neurotransmitter systems implicated in the positive symp-
toms of psychosis. Explanatory models inspired by dop-
amine's role in learning and motivation have been proposed
to account for the positive symptoms of psychosis
(Beninger 1988; Corlett et al. 2007; Gray 2004; Kapur
2003; Miller 1976). Amphetamine elevates dopamine levels
in the striatum in healthy volunteers and more so in
individuals with schizophrenia (Laruelle et al. 2003). The
magnitude of dopamine release in remitted patients corre-
lates with the severity of symptom relapse experienced
(Laruelle et al. 1999). After King et al. (1984), Shaner
(1999) offered an explanation of the delusions induced by
amphetamine administration, which appealed to a chaotic
increase in mesocorticolimbic dopamine, driving supersti-
tious behaviours akin to those seen in experimental animals
undergoing instrumental learning (King et al. 1984; Shaner
1999; Skinner 1948).
Kapur (2003) suggested that amphetamines and endog-
enous psychotic states were associated with an increase in
striatal dopamine and that this increase led to the
inappropriate attribution of motivational salience to stimuli,
thoughts and percepts (Kapur 2003). Salience is a concept
derived from the addiction literature (Berridge and
Robinson 2003), and it refers to the capacity for stimuli
and events to grab attention and drive action. According to
Kapur, hallucinations and delusions result from dopamine-
driven attribution of inappropriate salience to internal and
external stimuli.
Acute amphetamine administration increases striatal
dopamine release in healthy humans (Laruelle et al. 1995,
1999), and the elegant positron emission tomography
experiments of Kegeles and colleagues demonstrate that
ketamine pre-treatment enhances this effect (Kegeles et al.
2000). This suggests that amphetamine-induced dopamine
release may be under glutamatergic control. This suggestion
was confirmed in primates administered with amphetamine:
PET showed that amphetamine-induced dopamine release
was blocked by a metabotropic glutamate receptor agonist
(van Berckel et al. 2006). That is, it appears that that acute
administration of amphetamine increases dopamine release
by increasing pre-synaptic glutamate release (Krystal 2008).
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like ideas of the same intensity as ketamine and cannabis (as
we discuss below, repeated dosing is another matter). Rather,
elevated mood, grandiose ideas and hyperactivity are more
characteristic (JacobsandSilverstone1986). It also increases
perceptual acuity of the whole visual field (Fillmore et al.
2005), unlike ketamine, which enhances the salience of
discrete and apparently random objects, events and stimuli
(Corlett et al. 2007; Oye et al. 1992). We suggest that this
pattern of psychopathology is due to increased confidence
in actual perceptual inputs and predictions through en-
hanced dopaminergic (Laruelle et al. 1995, 1999) and
cholinergic function (Acquas and Fibiger 1998).
Speculation on the role of dopamine in confidence and
certainty derives from a further consideration of the
temporal characteristics of midbrain dopamine firing as
well as an appreciation of the role of dopamine in the
placebo effect. Whilst dopamine neurons in the midbrain
appear to code a simple mismatch between expectancy and
experience (Rescorla and Wagner 1972; Waelti et al. 2001),
their firing has other important properties. Notably, the
response that was originally invoked by a reward tracks
backwards in time, occurring in response to the environmen-
tal cue that best predicts the reward (Schultz 1998). This may
be a neural signature of stimulus substitution (Pavlov 1928),
representing an expectancy or anticipation of reward to
come and perhaps indicating the necessity for preparatory
behaviours such as approach (Robbins and Everitt 2007).
This expectation process has been strongly implicated in the
placebo effect, the observation that inert compounds can have
clinical efficacy in individuals who strongly expect to experi-
ence therapeutic benefits (Oken 2008); furthermore, such
expectations also influence visual perception (Sterzer et al.
2008). In addition, a sense of lack of control, which
presumably is associated with an elevation in uncertainty,
renders healthy individuals more likely to experience patterns
in random data (a tendency which may relate directly to
hallucinations; Whitson and Galinsky 2008). Critically, dopa-
mine has been implicated in the placebo response. Subjects
who have higher striatal dopamine levels show stronger
anticipatory responses during reward learning and a stronger
placebo response to what they believed were anti-nociceptive
preparations (Scott et al. 2007). Based on these data, one
might expect that elevating dopamine levels with amphetamine
would enhance the strength of anticipatory top-down expec-
tation. However, dopamine also enhances the signal-to-noise
ratio of perceptual inputs (Spitzer 1995; Spitzer and Walter
2003). This would increase the extent to which a bottom-up
signal matches a strong top-down expectancy, leading to
increased confidence in the capacity to predict and control the
environment. This may manifest as increased perceptual
clarity, cognitive capabilities and, potentially, grandiosity rather
than hallucinations and delusions of reference.
A richer pattern of psychopathology is induced through
repeated amphetamine administration. This includes behav-
iour suggesting hallucinations in primates chronically
administered amphetamines (Castner and Goldman-Rakic
1999, 2003) and a full-blown psychotic illness (including
profound delusions and hallucinations) in humans. It is
noteworthy therefore that repeated administration of am-
phetamine to humans alters striatal responsivity (Boileau et
al. 2006). Animal models suggest that this may be due to
changes in the morphology of dendritic spines in striatal
medium spiny neurons (Waltz et al. 2007), altered expres-
sion of NMDA and AMPA receptors (Lu et al. 1997;L u
and Wolf 1999) and changes in pre-frontal cholinergic
function (Sarter et al. 2005, 2008). All of the above
processes would alter the function of the Bayesian system
we describe through an AMPA/NMDA imbalance with a
corresponding change in the delicate balance between
bottom-up and top-down signalling. In this case, we would
predict that the effect would be more akin to (though
perhaps more profound than) an acute dose of PCP or
ketamine, with an impairment in both bottom-up and top-
down signalling.
We can contrast this picture with that hypothesised for
ketamine above, in which we suggested that excessive
AMPA transmission in the presence of NMDA blockade
leads to characteristic delusion-like ideas and perceptual
illusions. Repeated amphetamine administration would also
engender aberrant feed-forward AMPA-mediated prediction
error, but now in the context of a sensitised dopamine
system, prone to excessive and inappropriate dopamine
(and subsequent acetylcholine) release in response to non-
salient events (Nelson et al. 2002). Since these slower
transmitters are critical in specifying top-down perceptual
and attentional priors Collerton et al. 2005; Friston 2005b),
their inappropriate registration confers a sensory expectan-
cy when there should be none, engendering hallucinations
proper rather than the odd perceptions characteristic of
ketamine (Pomarol-Clotet et al. 2006).
Sensory deprivation: a non-drug model of psychosis
The impact of sensory deprivation on psychosis
and psychotogenic drug effects
We have outlined a Bayesian account of the psychotomi-
metic effects of various drug manipulations. But, of course,
the system may be perturbed in other ways. For example, if
we reduce sensory input while individuals are under the
influence of psychotomimetic drugs, at least some of the
psychotogenic properties of these compounds should be
changed. This is indeed the case. Lawes (1963) investigated
the psychopathology induced by PCP under three levels of
sensory stimulation: (1) normal social interaction with a
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proofed cubicle under conditions of maximum sensory
deprivation (with gloves to block tactile input), opaque
goggles and lights turned out to attenuate visual inputs; and
finally, (3) social isolation (in the deprivation chamber but
without gloves and goggles and with the lights on).
Condition (1), social interaction, led to the strongest
psychopathological reactions. Condition (3), social but not
sensory deprivation, induced an intermediate reaction. The
weakest response to PCP was observed while subjects were
under maximal sensory and social deprivation (condition
(2); Lawes 1963).
These findings corroborate observations made on
patients with schizophrenia in sensory deprivation. Harris
(1959) found that patients with schizophrenia tolerated
30 min of sensory deprivation much better than controls.
Five of 12 patients failed to complete a further 2 h of
deprivation (three due to boredom and two due to
enhancement of symptom severity). Many of the remaining
subjects felt a therapeutic benefit, in particular an attenu-
ation of auditory hallucinations (Harris 1959). We will
return to the interactions of PCP and schizophrenia and
sensory deprivation below, after considering the effects of
sensory deprivation alone.
Sensory deprivation alone
In the absence of a psychotomimetic compound, sensory
deprivation alone can act as a model of psychosis in
psychiatrically healthy individuals (Rosenzweig 1959).
Explorers (Byrd 1938) and prisoners of war (Worden
1954), subjected to extended periods of sensory and social
isolation, describe changes in their experiences and cogni-
tion comparable to those induced by pharmacological
intervention with psychotomimetic drugs (Luby et al.
1959). Experimental isolation and sensory deprivation of
student volunteers led to changes in concentration, affective
disturbances, vivid visual, auditory and tactile hallucina-
tions and delusions (Bexton et al. 1954; Scott et al. 2007).
How can deprivation have such contradictory effects in
healthy individuals and those experiencing psychosis
(pharmacological or endogenous)? Within the framework
of the Bayesian model, we suggest that a healthy individual
under sensory deprivation experiences a lack of bottom-up
sensory stimulation. Since sensory stimulation is normally
much greater, the predictions of higher brain regions are
violated. In addition, sensory deprivation by physical
means is never complete and there are baseline, noisy,
fluctuations in firing in the brain. In other words, the
sensorially deprived state involves low-level noisy bottom-
up signals combined with strong priors that are accustomed
to acting upon stronger signals. The top-down, NMDA-
based, descending projections attempt to impose some
structure upon their noisy and much-reduced inputs. Thus,
just as with pharmacologically modelled psychoses (partic-
ularly serotonergic models—see above), there are predic-
tion errors and noisy signals treated as genuine inputs by
higher levels in the hierarchy. The consequence of this
would be hallucinations.
The delusions characteristic of sensory isolation tend to
involve autoscopic experiences of other presences in the
isolation chamber, which induce paranoia and feelings of
being observed (Bexton et al. 1954; Scott et al. 2007). Such
phenomena might arise from a strong top-down expectancy
of the presence of other people, which might pre-dominate
even in isolation leading to the strong sense of another
person in the isolation chamber perhaps inducing paranoia
(Hoffman 2007). Indeed, the paranoia and hallucinations
experienced in sensory deprivation, which we argue are
resultant from bottom-up noise in the face of preserved (or
even relatively enhanced) top-down mechanisms, may
share phenomenological and biological similarities with
the serotonergic hallucinogens discussed above. Both sets
of phenomena occur when the top-down system imposes
structure on noisy, unpredictable bottom-up signals.
In support of this ‘imposition of structure on noise’
interpretation, Rosenzweig and Gardner (1966) observed
much milder psychopathology in individuals subjected to
tactile and visual deprivation but exposed to structured,
meaningful, auditory inputs (tapes of jokes, stories and
plays) compared with individuals similarly deprived of
tactile and visual inputs and additionally played meaning-
less white noise or the same tapes played in reverse
(Rosenzweig and Gardner 1966). Interestingly, hallucina-
tions in schizophrenia appear to get worse when sensory
input is noisier (Margo et al. 1981).
These observations may help to explain the apparently
paradoxical pro-psychotic effects of sensory deprivation in
non-psychotic individuals and the anti-psychotic effects in
actively psychotic subjects. In individuals suffering from
drug-induced or endogenous psychotic symptoms, sensory
deprivation may provide respite from excessive feed-
forward activation in the Bayesian hierarchy (which we
attribute to increased and inappropriate AMPA receptor
stimulation). Essentially, when sensory stimulation is
reduced, in psychotic people, perhaps the strength of the
aberrant bottom-up signal is attenuated, relieving the top-
down prediction system and reducing the tendency to try to
impose structure on meaningless noise. Put simply, perhaps
the over-rich sensory experience of the psychotic person is
temporarily assuaged by sensory deprivation. However, as
Harris (1959) observed, sensory deprivation was pro-
psychotic in some patients, and baseline schizotypal traits
seem to predispose individuals towards more severe
positive symptoms during sensory deprivation (McCreery
and Claridge 1996). Perhaps this observation that a
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uals but not others is reflective of variability in top-down
information processing biases.
Visual sensory deprivation (by occluding the eyes)
results in changes in glutamatergic function. Specifically,
in the context of the above, it is worth noting that sensory
deprivation increases pre-synaptic glutamate release
(Yashiro et al. 2005), perhaps as a consequence of the
prediction errors induced by sensory inputs that are lower
than expected, which would then engage top-down infer-
ence mechanisms. Accompanying this enhanced glutamate
release, there are changes in metabotropic glutamate
receptor activity and concomitant changes in synaptic
plasticity (Van Keuren-Jensen and Cline 2006). Perhaps
this provides a further neurochemical basis for understand-
ing the ameliorating effects of sensory deprivation on
psychotic individuals. That is, the increase in mGluR
function associated with sensory deprivation might coun-
teract the mGluR alteration of psychosis. In this regard, it is
noteworthy that an mGlur agonist has recently shown
promising results as an anti-psychotic in patients with
schizophrenia (Patil et al. 2007). Our theory suggests that
pre-treating healthy individuals with the mGlur agonist
before sensory deprivation should attenuate the psychoto-
genic effects (since the agonist should decrease noisy
AMPA transmission below baseline). Furthermore, enhanc-
ing NMDA receptor function (for example with d-
cycloserine) in advance of deprivation should enhance the
psychotomimetic effect in healthy individuals since NMDA
receptors provide the priors, which are imposed even in the
absence of stimulation.
There is another non-drug model of psychosis, namely
sleep deprivation. Sleep deprivation alters dopamine turn-
over in the striatum (Volkow et al. 2009)a sw e l la sN M D A
and AMPA function in pre-frontal cortex (Szabo et al.
2009). Phenomenologically, sleep deprivation appears to
engender a manic state, not unlike acute amphetamine
(Milad et al. 2007; Tyler 1955); furthermore, it has an
impact on the BDII: Sleep-deprived individuals perceive the
hollow mask as hollow (Schneider et al. 1996), suggesting
an impairment of top-down processing. Chronic amphet-
amine abuse is also associated with sleep deprivation
(Williamson et al. 1997). The additional, top-down process-
ing impairment mediated by sleep disturbance may provide
another mechanism, in addition to neuroplastic sensitization,
through which the more profound psychopathology associ-
ated with chronic amphetamine use may arise.
Limitations
In trying to relate the main models of psychosis to their pre-
dominant effects, we have taken a necessarily simplified
view of the balance between prior beliefs and bottom-up
signal in the form of prediction error. First, we have alluded
to the Bayesian hierarchical structure, but have largely
confined our discussion to a consideration of the inter-
actions only at a single level. This neglects the likelihood
that, as one moves from basic sensory processing through
to the highest levels of inference and belief, the top-down/
bottom-up interactions perhaps encode different features of
our signals about the world. One distinction that we have
drawn only briefly in this paper is between the strength of
the signal and our confidence in its value (see Fletcher and
Frith 2009). One possibility is that lower levels in the
hierarchy are more concerned with the signal-to-noise ratio,
while higher levels are more concerned with the overall
confidence in the signals. We believe that a more in-depth
consideration of this distinction, in the setting of psychosis,
will be very useful in the future.
Conclusions
To summarise, we have outlined a cognitive neuroscience
framework of perception and learning that we have used to
explain the psychotomimetic effects of a number of model
psychoses. We have attempted to do so in a way that
crosses levels of explanation (Marr 1982) in order to allow
a meaningful consideration of the symptoms of psychosis,
the computational cognitive processes that might be key to
understanding them and the neurobiological implementa-
tion of these processes,
Our framework is grounded in Bayes rule but has much
in common with formal animal learning theory (Courville
et al. 2006; Kruschke et al. 2005). At its core is the notion
that much of what we perceive is based on our expectations
(Helmholtz 1871/1971) that perceptual expectations are
learned (Barlow 1990; Pavlov 1928) and that mismatches
between what we expect and what we experience drive
updating of our expectancies (Friston 2005a). The psychot-
ic process can and should, we argue, be understood in terms
of precise disturbances in this system. Common to the
transiently induced psychosis-like states in humans are
pharmacological (and occasionally non-pharmacological)
interventions that impact upon, the prediction error, the priors
and the subsequent updating process. The specific pattern of
psychopathology that each model induces can be explained
by its relative impact upon these three processes. We find that
the model provides an explanation of the observation that
drugs with apparently disparate pharmacological targets can
have apparently similar psychotomimetic effects.
Our attempt to explain the psychotic symptoms rests
critically on the role of glutamatergic processes in mediat-
ing bottom-up and top-down processing (via AMPA and
NMDA receptors, respectively) as well as the roles of
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down expectancies. To speculate a little further, one
possible means of interaction between these slow and fast
processes lies in the modulation of membrane potassium
channel conductances, which would change the membrane
potential and hence susceptibility to excitation by incoming
signals (Fiorillo et al. 2003). Dopamine and acetylcholine
modulate these conductances (McCormick et al. 1993).
Moreover, recently, the hallucinogen N,N-dimethyltrypta-
mine (DMT) has been shown to modulate sigma receptors
and, in so doing, to alter potassium channel conductances
(Fontanilla et al. 2009). We wish to highlight the utility of
our proposed Bayesian framework in bringing together
disparate psychotomimetic preparations and revealing a
potential unifying neurophysiological process. The modu-
lation of membrane potassium channel conductance may
provide a novel therapeutic target for the positive symp-
toms of psychosis; indeed, retigabine, a drug which opens
potassium channels, has recently been reported to have anti-
psychotic like effects (Sotty et al. 2009).
A consideration of aberrations of the dynamic interac-
tions between sensation, expectation, inference and learning
provide a framework to understand how pharmacological
interventions can alter neural responses and hence change
conscious experiences, inducing the apparent disconnection
from reality that is characteristic of psychosis.
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